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ABSTRACT
In cloud computing, software-defined network (SDN) gaining more attention due to its advantages in
network configuration to improve network performance and network monitoring. SDN addresses an
issue of static architecture in traditional networks by allowing centralised control of a network system.
SDN contains centralised network intelligence module which separates a process of forwarding
packets (data plane) from packet routing process (control plane). It is essential to ensure the
correctness of SDN due to secure data transmitting in it. In this paper. Model-checking is chosen to
verify an SDN network. The Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) used
as a specification to express properties of an SDN. Then complete SDN structure is defined formally
along with its Kripke structure. Finally, temporal properties are analysed against the SDN Kripke
model to assure the properties of SDN is correct.
Keywords Software Defined Network · Formal Verification ·Model Checking
1 Introduction
Software-Defined Network (SDN) [1] is gaining more attention due to its advantages in network configuration to
improve network performance and network monitoring. So it is essential to ensure the correctness of SDN [17]. In this
article, we describe SDN in the Kripke structure along with specifications, then the security properties of an SDN are
expressed using temporal formulas. Later, the security properties of the SDN are analysed against a designed Kripke
model using model checking.
There are several formal verification techniques [2][3] studied in recent years such as model checking, abstract
interpretation and boolean satisfiability [7][8]. Model-checking is widely used in many fields such as verification of
hardware, software and security and safety protocols [15][16]. In model checking, the system is modelled as a state
machine and specifications (properties of the system) expresses in linear temporal logic and computation tree logic.
SPIN [4] and SMV [5] are famous model checkers, LTL specifications [6] are allowed to express in SPIN and CTL
specifications [6] are in SMV. It is known that automata-based verification can lead to state explosion problem. To
address the state explosion problem, symbolic model checking (SMC) [9] and abstract model checking (AMC) [10] has
been developed with successful results. The combination of SMC and Binary Decision Trees (BDDs) [11] maximise the
states in the system, but a bottleneck in manipulating the amount of memory required to store BDDs. Bounded Model
Checking (BMC) [12] progresses fastly after SMC, the basic idea of BMC is to find a counterexample in executions
whose length k. The BMC problem can quickly reduce to satisfiability problem, which can be verified using SAT
solvers [13]. Modern SAT solvers can handle satisfiability problem with thousands of variables.
The contribution of the paper is as follows:
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• Formal representation of software-defined networks.
• Representation of SDN in a Kripke structure for verification.
• Formal analysis of SDN properties against the formal SDN Kripke model.
• Formal analysis of faulty transition in the Kripke model of SDN.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The necessary background required for the proposed method is defined in
Section 2. Section 3 and 4 describes the software-defined network and our solution, including a designed formal model
for SDN and verification properties of SDN. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 5.
2 Background
2.1 Kripke Structure
A Kripke structure M [14] is a tuple M=(Init, States, Transition, Labelling), where ‘States’ is the set of states which are
defined by a set of propositions ‘A’ hold on the states, ‘Init’ ⊆ ‘States’ is the set of initial states, ‘Transition’ ⊆ ‘States’
× ‘States’ and ‘Labelling’ is a labelling function, ‘Labelling’: ‘States’→ 2A.
2.2 Linear-Time Temporal Logic
Linear-time temporal logic, or LTL for short, is a temporal logic, with connectives that allow us to refer to the future. It
models time as a sequence of states, extending infinitely into the future. This sequence of states is sometimes called a
computation path, or simply a path. Linear-time temporal logic (LTL) has the following syntax given in Backus Naur
form:
φ::= > | ⊥ | p | (¬φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | (Xφ) | (Fφ) | (Gφ) | (φ U φ) | (φ R φ)
where p is any propositional atom from some set of Atoms. Thus, the symbols > and ⊥ are LTL formulas, as are all
atoms from Atoms; and ¬φ is an LTL formula if φ is one, etc. The connectives X, F, G, U and R are called temporal
connectives. X means ‘neXt state,’ F means ‘some Future state,’ and G means ‘all future states (Globally).’ The next
two, U and R are called ‘Until’ and ‘Release’ respectively.
Definition 1: In a given model M, a path Σ is defined as a sequence of connected edges which connect nodes, lets say
s0, s1, s2. . .sn in S are the nodes such that ∀m≥0, sm −→ sm+1. The path Σ= s0, s1, s2. . .sn represents a sequence
of nodes in a system M, we define Σi as starting from si, for example Σ5 is s5, s6, s7. . . sn.
Definition 2: A satisfaction relation |= is defined for the model M, considering paths Σ to check linear temporal logic
(LTL) formula satisfies Σ. The satisfaction relation |= over Σ and LTL formula is specified as:
• Σ |= >, where > represents true
• Σ |= q, iff q ∈ L(s)
• Σ |= Xψ iff Σ2 |= ψ
• Σ |= Gψ iff ∀m m≥1, Σm |= ψ
• Σ |= Fψ iff ∃m m≥1, Σm |= ψ
• Σ |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff ∃m m≥1 such that Σm |= ψ2 and ∀n, n=1, 2, 3...m-1 satisfies Σn |= ψ1
2.3 Computation Tree Logic
Definition 3: Computation Tree Logic is a technique to represent time in a tree-like structure in which future is not
determined; there are many paths in which ‘actual’ path is realised. The Backus Naur form of CTL formulas are defined
as:
φ ::= > | ⊥ | p | (¬φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | (AXφ) | (EXφ) | (AGφ) | (EGφ) | (AFφ) | (EFφ) | (A[φ U φ]) |
(E[φ U φ])
Definition 4: Let M = (S,→, L) be a model for CTL, s in S, φ a CTL formula. The relation M, s |= φ is defined by
structural induction on φ:
• M, s |= > and M, s 6|= ⊥
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• M, s |= q iff q ∈ L(s)
• M, s |= ¬φ iff M, s 6|= φ
• M, s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M, s |= φ1 and M, s |= φ2
• M, s |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff M, s |= φ1 or M, s |= φ2
• M, s |= φ1 → φ2 iff M, s 6|= φ1 or M, s |= φ2
• M, s |= AXφ iff for all s1 such that s→ s1 we have M, s1 |= φ. Thus, AX says: ‘in every next state’.
• M, s |= EXφ iff for some s1 such that s→ s1 we have M, s1 |= φ. Thus, EX says: ‘in some next state’.
• M, s |= AGφ iff for all paths s1→ s2→ s3→ ..., where s1 equals s, and all si along the path, we have M, si
|= φ.
• M, s |= AFφ iff for some paths s1→ s2→ s3→ ..., where s1 equals s, and all si along the path, we have M,
si |= φ.
• M, s |= AFφ iff for all paths s1→ s2→ s3→ ..., where s1 equals s, and there is some si such that M, si |= φ.
• M, s |= EFφ iff for some paths s1 → s2 → s3 → ..., where s1 equals s, and for some si along the path, we
have M, si |= φ.
• M, s |= A[φ1Uφ2] iff for all paths s1→ s2→ s3→ ..., where s1 equals s, that path satisfies φ1 U φ2.
• M, s |= E[φ1Uφ2] iff for some paths s1→ s2→ s3→ ..., where s1 equals s, that path satisfies φ1 U φ2.
3 Software Defined Network
SDN works on OpenFlow protocol; OpenFlow is a communication interface defined between the controlling plane and
data plane. OpenFlow allows direct access to data plane devices, such as switches and routers. OpenFlow separates
network control from networking switches and allows centralized control of a network. OpenFlow allows controller
software to define how a network flow passes through the network devices based on application and cloud resources.
OpenFlow enables the network to be programmed based on a per-flow basis. An OpenFlow architecture provides
granular control on a network to respond to dynamic changes at an application level; this architecture overcomes
disadvantages of IP-based routing, which follows the same path regardless of different requirements. Here we present
the OpenFlow specification terms:
• Action: an operation on a packet to perform forward and modify a packet.
• Connection: a network connection between a switch and a controller.
• Flow table: it contains a set of flow entries.
• Flow entry: a unit in a flow table to process packets. Flow entry contains match fields for matching packet
headers and instructions to apply on a packet.
• Packet forwarding: forwarding packet to an output port or a set of output ports.
• Packet forwarding: forwarding packet to an output port or a set of output ports.
• Header: a control information present in a packet used by a switch to recognise the packet and to inform the
switch for forwarding the packet.
• Message: a message sent from the OpenFlow protocol for OpenFlow connection.
In this section, we present a formal definition of SDN and security properties which are necessary for SDN. SDN is a
tuple SDN:= (Pt, W, C, FTab, T, ConfiG) where,
3.1 Packet
A packet Pt is a tuple (h, pLD) consists of a packet header ‘h’ and payload data ‘pLD’ information which is transmitted
in a network. The packet header <st, dt, (α1, α1, . . αn)> contains source address ‘st’, destination address ‘dt’ and
packet pattern (α1, . . αn) which is used to match with ports of the switch during transmission in a network system.
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3.2 OpenFlow Switch
An OpenFlow switche ‘w’ contains one or more flow tables, which performs packet lookup and forwarding. A switch
communicates with the controller, and the controller manages the switch via OpenFlow protocol. The controller can
add, delete and update the flow entries of the flow table belongs to switches. Each entry of flow table contains match
fields and instructions to match packets. Matching of the packet header with the first flow table continues to additional
flow tables. If a matching entry found, then those instructions are used to forward a packet. If no match of entries in the
flow table, then a further configuration of a missed flow entry has to proceed by forwarding a packet to the controller,
or packet can be dropped. The instructions belong to each entry of flow table contains actions. The actions are the
instructions to forward or modify a packet.
‘W’ is a set of switches W={w1, w2, w3...wn}, each switch is a tuple w:= (P, Wc, FR) where ‘P’ is a set of ports in a
switch represented as P={p1, p2, p3...pn}. A port ‘p’ either a input or a output port represented as p(ip, op), where ‘ip’
is a set of input ports and ‘op’ is a set of output ports. Each input and output port consists of port ID, which is used to
forward a packet and drop a packet based on forwarding rules which are received from the controller. Wc is switch
controlling software which handles matching functions to route the packets to appropriate network devices. FR is a
finite set of information to represents forwarding rules denoted as FR={r1, r2, r3...rn}. ‘SwitchTrust’ is an assignment
function ‘SwitchTrust’: W→ Label, which assigns each switch with a label, more the number of labels in a switch is
considered as a most trusted switch.
3.3 SDN Controller
SDN controller is a tuple C:= {Mh, FC, δ, sc0, S
c} that manages control flow of the network based on OpenFlow
protocol.
• Sc is a set of control states.
• sc0 is a set of initial control states, sc0 ⊆ Sc.
• Mh: h→h′ is a header modification function that modifies the packet header based on controller policies.
• FC: h × Ns × PESA→ FR is a forward rule calculator function, where h is a packet header, Ns: W s × h→
pi is a network status, which is used to find a feasible path of a packet in a set of all possible paths pi. Paths pi
are arranged based on feasibility to reach destination i.e. {pi0, pi1, pi2, ..., pin}∈pi, where pi0 ranks high to route
a packet, pi1 ranks next of pi0.
• δ ⊆ Sc ×Mh × FC × Sc is a transition relation.
3.4 OpenFlow Table
This section describes the components of the flow table ‘FTab’ along with the mechanics of matching and action handling.
OpenFlow switch has two types: OpenFlow only and OpenFlow- hybrid. OpenFlow switches support OpenFlow
pipeline only. OpenFlow-hybrid switches support both OpenFlow operation and Ethernet switching operation.
The OpenFlow pipeline of every switch contains one or more flow tables, each flow table contains multiple entries.
The OpenFlow pipeline processing unit defines how packets interact with the flow tables. An OpenFlow switch is
required to have at least one ingress flow table (flow table to handle packet at an input port of a switch). Pipeline
processing happens in two stages: ingress processing and egress processing (egress port that forwards network traffic to
analysis tools). The outcome of ingress processing is to forward a packet to an output port, the switch may perform
egress processing in the context of an output port. Egress processing is optional, and a switch may not support egress
processing.
During the processing of the flow table, a packet header is matched against the flow entries of the flow table. If a flow
entry is found, the instruction in that flow entry is executed. If the listing is matched, the instructions in that flow entry
are executed. These instructions are used to route the packet to another flow table if the current flow table priory is less
than other. If the matching flow entry does not direct to another flow table, then the current flow entries are used to
forward the packet to an output port. If a packet does not match with any flow entries in a flow table, then we call it
table miss based on flow table configuration. The instructions of a missed flow entry in a flow table can specify how to
handle unmatched packets. The unmatched packet may drop, passing to another table or sending to a controller for
further configuration.
The OpenFlow expects the mapping between network elements is consistent in following functionalities:
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• Table consistency, in which the packet must match same as all other OpenFlow Tables. Furthermore, a
difference in matching is due to contents of a flow table, and the packet header cannot be altered unless
explicitly specified by the OpenFlow processing.
• Flow entry consistency, in which the actions of a flow entry apply to a packet is consistent with flow entry
match. If a match field of flow entry matches a packet header, then the set-field of a flow table modifies the
packet header, unless explicit OpenFlow processing has modified the packet.
A flow table entry of the form, {match fields, priority, counters, instructions, timeouts, cookie, flags}. A match field is
to match packets, and it consists of the ingress port and packet header information, and optionally contains meta-data of
the previous flow table. A priority for matching flow entry of a flow table. Counters are updated once the packet is
matched with a flow entry. An instruction is used to modify the action set and pipeline processing. Timeouts are the
maximum amount of time or idle time before the switch expires flow. A cookie is opaque data chosen by a controller;
this data is used by the controller to filter the flow entries affected by flow statistics, flow modification and deletion
requests. A flag alters the flow entries, for example, the flag OFFF_SEND_FLOW_REMOVAL is used to remove
messages of that flow entry. All flow tables must support a table-miss flow entry to handle table misses. A table-miss
entry has a piece of information to handle unmatched packets. An unmatched packet may be: dropped, send to a
controller for further configuration or forwarded to subsequent flow tables.
3.5 Topology and Configuration
Topology ‘T’ of an SDN is a binary relation T⊆((W × OP)×(W × IP)) on switches and ports of the network system.
The nodes of a network are represented by a relation (W × OP) and (W × IP). Furthermore, <h, p, w> denotes the
packet state in the network, where ‘h’ is a packet header, and ‘p’ and ‘w’ is a port of a switch ‘w’.
Trans(nodes) =

∧
∃w∈W
ConfiGw(< h, p >,< h, p >), if nodes < 2.∧
w∈W
ConfiGw(< h, p >,< h, p
′ >), if nodes ≥ 2. (1)
Trans(nodes) =

∧
∃w∈W
ConfiGw(< h, p >,< h, p >), if nodes < 2.∧
w∈W
ConfiGw(< h, p >,< h
′, p′ >), if nodes ≥ 2. (2)
Once the topology of the network is ready, then the packet transmission relation among the switches is given in recursive
relation. Equation 1 presents a packet transmission relation without modifying packet header ‘h’ from input port p to
p’. Equation 2 presents a packet transmission relation with modifying packet header ‘h’ from input port p to p’. In
both equations 1 and 2, the first condition of the equation presents a packet dropping node, where the number of nodes
in a network is not sufficient to send a packet across the network. The second condition of the equations presents a
transmission relation across the nodes of a network based on network configuration function ConfiG.
ConfiG is network configuration function, which assigns forwarding rules to switches, ConfiG: W→ FR. Packets enter
into an input port of a switch is configure and forwarded based on forwarding rules. A run of an SDN is a sequence of
transmission nodes is present as:
run = (ConfiG0, w0)
P t1−−→ (ConfiG1, w1) P
t
2−−→ ... P
t
i−−→ (ConfiGi, wi)
P ti+1−−−→ (∗) (3)
Pair (ConfiGi, wi) is considered as routing configuration by a controller to the switch wi. A run is a sequence of
nodes in a network, which allows packet P ti is passing through in it.
4 Representation of SDN in Kripke and SAT Structure for Model Checking
Verification of SDN security properties is essential, and it enhances the confidence of the system. In this section, we
present an SDN’s Kripke structure along with specifications of SDN using LTL and CTL. Kripke structure of an SDN
and its specifications are used in the verification process via model checking. Due to the advantages of Bounded model
checking, we reduce the model checking problem with a bound, which can be solved by SAT solvers.
The Kripke structure of an SDN is a tuple SDN=(S0, S, T, L) as shown in figure 1, where:
• S0 is a set of initial states where, S0⊆ S.
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Figure 1: kripke model for software defined network
• ‘S’ is a set of states (Sc, Sw ∈S, where Sc represents states belong to the controller and Sw represents states
belong to switch).
• T ⊆ S × S is a transition relation ({(Sc×Sc), (Sc×Sw), (Sw×Sc), (Sw×Sw) } ∈ T), where Sc and Sw is a
set of states in a controller and switch.
• ‘L’ is a labelling function ‘L’: ‘S’→ 2A. In our model we used boolean vector <I, W, C , FC, Mh, O > ∈ A. ‘I’
and ‘O’ are the bits to represent the input and output port of a switch and a controller. ‘W’ is a bit to represent
a packet state in a switch and ‘C’ is a bit to represent the packet state in a controller. FC and Mh are the bits to
represent states, where forward rules calculation and header modification happens.
Given a Kripke structure of SDN, the specifications of a system are expressed using an LTL or CTL formula ‘f’ and a
bound ‘d’, and semantics of BMC can describe a process of constructing a propositional formula [SDN, Xf ]d.
Let (s0, s1, s2, . . sd) be a finite sequence of states in a path pi. The description of a formula [SDN, Xf ]d contains two
components: SDN is a propositional formula that contains (s0, s1, s2, . . sd) and Xf is also a propositional formula to
validate the constraints given in a formula ‘f’. To define specification constraints Xf , we provide a definition of loop
condition ‘Lj’ which is propositional formula that is true if there is a loop in path pi. Loop condition is considered as
valid if there is a transition from ‘j’ to previous states.
Lj :=
j∨
i=0
(Sj , Si) (4)
For a Kripke structure SDN, and d ≥ 0,
[SDN ]d := Init(S0) ∧
d−1∧
i=1
(Si, Si+1) (5)
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The complete formula, which includes an SDN model and specification is presented in a boolean formula [SDN, Xf ]d.
[SDN,Xf ]d := Init(S0) ∧
d−1∧
i=1
(Si, Si+1) ∧ (¬Ld ∧ [Xf ]d) (6)
Consider a Kripke structure of an SDN in figure 2. Each state of an SDN represented by five-bit variables. We use b[5],
b[4], b[3], b[2], b[1] and b[0], where b[5] is a high bit and b[0] be the low bit. The initial state of an SDN is represented
as follows,
Init(S0) := b[5] ∧ b[4] ∧ ¬b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0] (7)
The transition relation of an SDN is represented as follows,
T (s, s′) := {(b[5] ∧ b[4] ∧ ¬b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]
∧b′[5] ∧ ¬b′[4] ∧ b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ ¬b′[0])
∨
(b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ ¬b′[4] ∧ b′[3] ∧ b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ ¬b′[0])
∨
(¬b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ ¬b′[4] ∧ b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ b′[0])
∨
(¬b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ b′[4] ∧ ¬b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ b′[0])
∨
(¬b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ b′[4] ∧ ¬b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ b′[1] ∧ ¬b′[0])
∨
(¬b[5] ∧ b[4] ∧ ¬b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ b′[4] ∧ ¬b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ b′[0])
∨
(¬b[5] ∧ b[4] ∧ ¬b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ b[0]
∧b′[5] ∧ b′[4] ∧ ¬b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ ¬b′[0])
∨
(b[5] ∧ b[4] ∧ ¬b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]
∧¬b′[5] ∧ b′[4] ∧ ¬b′[3] ∧ ¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ b′[0])
}
(8)
4.1 Analyse with a Faulty Transition
We now add a faulty transition from state 101000 to state 001001 denote by Tf .
Tf (s, s
′) := T (s, s′) ∨ (b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ ¬b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0] ∧ ¬b′[5] ∧ ¬b′[4] ∧ b′[3]
∧¬b′[2] ∧ ¬b′[1] ∧ b′[0]) (9)
Consider the primary property of an SDN, forward rules has to calculate for every packet which is pass through the
controller for routing. The property is represented as Gp, where p is ¬b[5] ∧ ¬b[4] ∧ b[3] ∧ b[2] ∧ ¬b[1] ∧ ¬b[0]. Using
BMC, we generate a counterexample results witness of F¬p. The absence of such property indicates the SDN property
is violated.
Consider a case where the bound d = 2 and unrolling the faulty SDN system transition relation in the following formula:
[[SDN ]]2 := Init(S0) ∧ Tf (S0, S1) ∧ Tf (S1, S2) (10)
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The loop condition is represented as:
L2 :=
2∨
i=0
(S2, Si) (11)
The formula on a path without loops:
[[F (¬p)]]02 := ¬p(S0) ∨ [[F (¬p)]]12
[[F (¬p)]]12 := ¬p(S1) ∨ [[F (¬p)]]22
[[F (¬p)]]22 := ¬p(S2) ∨ [[F (¬p)]]32
[[F (¬p)]]32 := 0
(12)
Finally by substituting all terms and we get:
[[F (¬p)]]02 := ¬p(S0) ∨ ¬p(S1) ∨ ¬p(S2) (13)
By putting SDN transitions, loop condition and property together, we can get a new formula:
[[SDN,F (¬p)]]2 := [[SDN ]]2 ∧ (¬L2 ∧ [[F (¬p)]]02) (14)
Since a missing path is sufficient to prove a violation of SDN property, the loop condition is excluded. This results in
the following formula:
[[SDN,F (¬p)]]2 := [[SDN ]]2 ∧ [[F (¬p)]]02 :=
Init(S0) ∧ Tf (S0, S1) ∧ Tf (S1, S2) ∧ (¬p(S0) ∨ ¬p(S1) ∨ ¬p(S2)) (15)
The assignment 110000, 101000, 001001 satisfies the above formula [[SDN,F (¬p)]]2; this assignment violates the
fundamental property of an SDN.
4.2 Expression of SDN Properties using Temporal Logic
AG(Wip → A(¬W ′ipWFC): For any state in SDN, it is not possible to send a packet to next switch without having
forwarding rules.
AG(Cip → AX(FC)): For any state in SDN, where a packet enters the controller always calculate forwarding rules
for missed flow-entry before sending it to the switch.
AG(Wip ∧ ¬FC → AX(Cip)): For any state in SDN, where a packet enters the switch forwards to the controller for
calculating/configuring forwarding rules if the switch misses the flow entry.
AG(Wip ∧ FC → AX(Wop)): For any state in SDN, where a packet enters the switch’s input port should forward to
an output port if there are forwarding rules available to route the packet.
5 Conclusion
In cloud computing, software-defined network (SDN) gaining more attention due to its advantages in network configu-
ration to improve network performance and network monitoring. It is essential to ensure the correctness of SDN due to
secure data transmitting in it. In this paper, we present a work to apply formal techniques on the software-defined net-
work for verification. The software-defined network is formally described using the Kripke structure and its properties
are formally presented using temporal logic formulas. The SDN LTL or CTL properties are verified against the formal
Kripke model to check the specifications meets its model. Furthermore, we also analysed with a faulty transition and
verified faulty transition violates the fundamental properties of the SDN.
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